THE New Republic

Steel and the Public Interest

Editorial

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AUGUST 10, 1959

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Washington Wire

Nature Boy

UNDER APPROPRIATE circumstances, America ought to get Mr. K. over here in a hurry. Fascinated millions watched the recorded TV exchange between him and Nixon in Moscow. By mass communications a modern nation can now become emotionally aware of a personality overnight. In Khrushchev they saw a voluble, bouncy, rough-tough nature boy, tremendously magnetic — one of the world's great politicians, but knowing next to nothing about the US and aching to learn.

It was extraordinary to hear him demand a pledge from Nixon that his recorded comments be given a running English commentary when they are shown here.

Perhaps it was make-believe though it sounded genuine enough—an ignorance of the fact that any competitive broadcaster in America would stab his rival in the back for the opportunity to do just what Mr. Khrushchev wanted! Every ham gesture, every grimace of his mobile face attested shrewdness and ability to learn.

Not to let an opponent like this come into the country to correct his dangerous underestimate of us is folly.

White House Spectacular

JIM HAGERTY in 1953 wheeled the motion picture camera into the White House press conference and spoiled it. Protests at the time were unavailing. He turned a news gathering into a spectacle. Eisenhower now complains that he cannot get his views to the public through the cluttered conference. It shocks and stuns him that a Gallup poll indicates the man in the street thinks Democrats more likely to cure inflation than Republicans. *New York Herald Tribune* reporter Robert Donovan's official book on Eisenhower is full of his bewilderment over the unpredictable course of public opinion.

Certain it is that the 250-member White House conference is big, inchoate and often dominated by exhibitionists who like to see themselves quoted in the verbatim transcript. Nobody gets a chance at a follow-up question.

So now the White House is trying a series of informal dinners to supplement the press conferences by chats with a dozen or so reporters at a time over coffee and brandy. This has several disadvantages. It irritates those who aren't invited. And it runs into the problem that Eisenhower dislikes criticism (he scratched the name of one distinguished columnist who has found fault with his policies off the guest list).

He has now held two all-male press dinners. The first was with a dozen or so White House regulars who cover the President on full time. This caused some heart-burnings, for one or two were omitted. Chief amusement sprung from the way warmed-over material that suddenly leaped back on to front pages was mysteriously served up as coming from a "White House spokesman." The second dinner was with a group of bureau chiefs and press service men, including David Lawrence and *New York Times*man Arthur Krock, whose notable characteristic—with only a couple of exceptions—was their extreme conservatism.

The result illustrated the difficulties of Eisenhower leadership. He told them he favored a Khrushchev visit—indeed, it would be a good idea if the whole Presidium came! Public opinion, of course, would have to be carefully prepared for it. This was the report, at least, of one of the guests, conscientious columnist Roscoe Drummond.

How did the President begin the ploughing and tilling of public opinion? The very next day he was asked at his regular press conference, on the record, if he favored the Khrushchev visit. The matter had been "bandied back and forth in many countries," he said; indeed he volunteered that he had seen a poll on the subject. (He did not say what the poll showed or how he reacted.) He concluded, "I think it is one of those things that is a perennial question that will be talked about a lot all the time, and not merely because of this visit of the Vice President's."

Scripps-Howard columnist Andrew Tully, another dinner guest, revealed that the President has a "frank admiration" for several Democratic Senators, and named three — "Frank Lausche, Ohio; Spessard Holland, Florida, and John Stennis, Mississippi." Of that eminent racist and Presidential friend Stennis, Tully acknowledges that the President feels he "has had to take an extreme course on race relations."

Tick-Tock

THE CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL pendulum is about to swing back from "normalcy" to progressivism, predicts Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in an arresting 6,000-word analysis privately circulated among the Democratic Advisory Council. Democrats can cash in on the historical trend, he says, or they can hand it over to somebody like Nelson Rockefeller. Of Eisenhower he says: "Whenever clearcut issues threatened to burst into flame he doused them with torrents of platitude and piety." It is a document with a ferocious ring that makes your neck hairs tingle. This column will distribute a limited number of copies—free—one to a customer—to those sending a self-addressed stamped business envelope.

The President's coolness to Rockefeller's name is noticeable. When listing possible GOP candidates he emphasizes Nixon, or far-right Treasury Secretary Bob Anderson, and only adds Rockefeller, thoughtfully, when reminded.

T.R.B.

Summer Schedule

FOR A short time each summer, *The New Republic* is published every other week. This year, summer issues will be dated July 6, July 13, July 27, August 10 and August 24. Weekly publication will be resumed on September 7.

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Steel and the Public

DESPITE RIVAL statements and published financial reports, the approach of the end of the first month of the steel strike finds many of the relevant facts about union practices and company costs obscure. Secretary Mitchell's fact-finding mission, in the main a stalling device, will do some good if it pries more information loose. Nevertheless, a good many facts are plain and they point in one direction, to the capacity of the steel companies to pay the very modest wage increases for which David McDonald will settle, without raising steel prices. If they do nothing else, the earnings statements of the industry for the first half of 1959, and on which Mr. Eisenhower last week had no comment, establish this conclusion. The best word to describe these profits is sensational. United States Steel reported earnings of $254,948,496—a return on sales of over 10 percent. In their lesser degree the other companies enjoyed similarly bountiful returns. Unquestionably some of these profits resulted from the high operating rates caused by anticipations of the present strike. But that is less than the whole story. In 1958—mostly a year of recession—US Steel earned net profits of more than $300 million, a return on sales of 8.7 percent and on investment of 9.7 percent. Thus, even when operating rates fall below 50 percent, as they did for some time in 1958, the steel companies rejoice in a market position which returns them substantial profits.

In a competitive industry such profits would lead to the entry of new companies lured by gold or to price reductions by the old companies in order to discourage entry. But since it takes about half a billion dollars to set one's self up properly in the steel business, the threat of new competition is not very grave.

By what dialectical exercise can the companies justify profits which seem especially high in view of the industry's sheltered position? President Blough of US Steel offers an argument very popular among the leaders of big business. Steel profits have to be high because they are needed to finance modernization and expansion which, in turn, will keep steel prices low. Who judges the desirability of using profits in this way? Who decides what level they should reach? Management, of course. This argument is so little challenged that it demands close examination. Older theories of corporate operation argued that it was the obligation of management to pay out earnings as dividends. If stockholders then cared to reinvest their earnings in the same company, the company could sell them new securities. If the stockholders preferred to invest their dividends in another company, this was a sign that they found the grass greener elsewhere. President Blough's theory of corporate management denies stockholders the choice. Management, free of stockholder control, decides how much shall be paid out and how much retained.

The crux of the present dispute is to be found in the claims of management to regulate the rate of investment without reference to stockholder wishes, and to decide the level of wages and prices according to its own

Correspondence

▶ *Kennedy and McCarthy*

SIRS:

LET ME remind Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that the issue ("The Charge of McCarthyism," *NR*, July 27) is not whether Senator Kennedy "was ever an adherent of or a fellow-traveler of McCarthy." What concerns—and should deeply con-

(Continued on page 23)

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

"Fact for Today"

conception of industry welfare and public interest. This right of definition is implicit in Mr. Blough's argument. Half granting that the steel companies could raise wages without increasing prices, he then claims that such an increase would be inflationary anyway because it would lead to wage increases in other industries which could not absorb the larger costs without higher prices. The facts are open to challenge and the logic is dim.

The logic is weak because Mr. Blough's real point is not wages but an effort to gain more control over individual workers. What is going on is primarily a struggle between union and management over the right to change working conditions. Taking advantage of the President's anti-inflation drive and acquiescence of Democratic Congressional leadership, the steel companies are doing their best to revert to an earlier era of industrial relations.

It would be pleasant to conclude with the hope that in the end steel shortage and public opinion will modify managerial intransigence. Not only is this result far from inevitable, but the cost to the country of a long strike is very considerable. A strike which lasted long enough to exhaust inventories—three months at least—would curtail economic recovery, threaten national defense, and, not least, inflict major damage on strikers and their families, as well as on workers and businessmen in other industries. Almost certainly, also, the inflation which the steel companies so piously deplore would be fed by the resulting shortages.

If there is a single clear inference from the present crisis it is this: in any major industry the public interest is so deeply involved that the public, at its peril, leaves that interest to be defined by either party to a dispute. Only the naïve will expect a large company to be the ideal agency to define the appropriate wage and price settlement. The union is just as interested a party. When rival conceptions of public and special interests clash, tests of strength can be terribly costly.

Therefore, what must be sought is a better mechanism for identifying the public interest and presenting it forcefully to the disputants. The ray of hope is the evident anxiety companies and unions display about public opinion. No one wishes to prohibit strikes or set prices by government fiat, if there are alternatives. Stopping well short of these Draconian measures, the Congress can make institutional arrangements designed to identify the public interest, mobilize and focus informed opinion and, thus, strongly influence unions and management. An approach to such a goal is the establishment of a public hearing board before which large industries would present their cases for higher prices before they actually put them into effect. A second device might provide for the continuous existence of disinterested fact-finding boards which would swing into action before strikes began.

In part the efficacy of such devices depends upon the prestige of the citizens who administer them. But it rests also on an implied threat, that if the public interest is too boldly ignored stronger measures will follow. Among the stronger measures would be selective price controls in major industries. If the steel strike has revealed nothing else, it has disclosed the necessity of social invention, in this instance of more sensitive devices for identifying the public interest.

Science For Export

THE RUSSIAN PLAN for scientific world domination is moving ahead on schedule, if we can believe a recent statement by P. I. Polukhin of the Soviet Ministry for Higher and Special Education. "We have enough scientific and technical staff for our present and forseeable future demands," he told the International Conference on Public Education in Geneva. "In fact we have them to spare and could lend specialists to underdeveloped countries that request our aid."

Obviously, as the columns of "Help Wanted" pleas for engineers and technicians in every Sunday newspaper testify, the US cannot say the same. What the US has done since 1957, the year of the sputnik, does not put us in position to compete in the Point Four type of scientific aid the Russians are offering to underdeveloped lands.

Along with Soviet scientists go Soviet equipment, manuals, specification sheets and instructions—all in Rus-

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sian, of course—plus dependence on Russian parts and knowhow. The result can be a Soviet technological stranglehold on a large part of the world.

Our government is well aware of the countless "Ugly Russians"—scientists, engineers and technicians—who are turning up in Africa and Asia, speaking the language of the country and knowledgeable of the area to which they are assigned. But our officials are in no position to counter the threat these exports pose.

Since the end of World War II the United States has provided its scientists with an ideal climate for pursuing the most promising research. Many scientists are reluctant to leave this climate for a less rarefied one. The State Department's science adviser learned this when he tried to recruit competent science attaches for service abroad. Many expressed firm negativism at leaving their provincial lab benches for underdeveloped laboratories where they might lose professional contacts, be passed by or lose a discovery to someone else.

Unlike the Russians we must offer special inducements to entice our scientists abroad. We could—as *The New Republic* suggested in the second month post-Sputnik (December 2, 1957)—set up the same kind of government-financed education with post college obligations for scientists as we now offer to future military officers at West Point, Annapolis and in the ROTC program.

Is it inconceivable for the Congress to establish a voluntary scholarship program for promising young scientists, in return for three or four years service in the interests of their country? These young men and women, who would not otherwise find their way to underdeveloped lands, might make ideal emissaries for export, or at least free their more mature mentors for such service. Without such a program the alternative may be a number of nations as Russianized as Tsarist Russia was Frenchified.

Politicking on Labor

WHATEVER the President's motives the fact is that his July 29 endorsement of the Landrum-Griffin substitute makes him a party to Minority Leader Halleck's calculated effort to prevent enactment by the House of any labor bill in this pre-election year of 1959. How much better for Republican political purposes to have labor as an issue in '60 and be able to charge union-controlled Democrats with frustrating all reform! The President ought to know what nearly all of Washington knows—that if the House does pass the Landrum-Griffin measure (favored by the Chamber of Commerce) over the House Labor Committee bill reported out on July 23 (opposed by both labor and management) the bill will in all likelihood be unacceptable to Senate labor reformers such as John F. Kennedy who regard it, properly, as punitive, anti-labor legislation.

It was only after the most deliberate consideration and amid flying brickbats from a variety of labor and management lobbyists that the House Labor Committee was able to report out a bill at all. Although the AFL-CIO rejects it, the Labor Committee bill is not in our view punitive and still offers the best if not the only hope for legislation recording the corruption and misuse of power disclosed in some unions by the McClellan Committee. It is the best political hope: despite the campaigns of misrepresentation now being carried on to discredit it by the Teamsters, the Mine Workers and local management groups, the bill, once enacted, would in the end be likely to command widespread public acceptance and thus would offer a shield in the form of independent and even rank-and-file union support against future political reprisals. But the bill is also the best that we can expect as an honest attempt to steer a course in the general public interest. Thus it bars organizational and recognition picketing by a union only in the event that another union is validly recognized by management, or if the picketing union had lost a recognition election within the preceding 9-month period and could not demonstrate that in the interim it had come to represent the majority of workers. An allegation that the employer be charged with unfair election practices in the ballot would be a defense against a charge of illegal picketing.

By contrast, the Landrum-Griffin bill outlaws recognition and organizational picketing in a variety of pro-management circumstances—should the employer recognize another union (validly or otherwise); should a valid election be held at all during the preceding 12 months; and should the union be unable to adduce "a sufficient showing of interest" to back up a petition for a recognition election, or where picketing had been underway up to 30 days and no petition for election had been filed. It has no provision for a defense should the employer be charged with unfair election practices.

While one may grant the sincerity of some in management and their Congressional friends in believing that the Labor Committee bill does not have sharp enough teeth, the same cannot be said for the politically-motivated Republican leaders who appear ready to bed down with Jimmy Hoffa and John L. Lewis (an estimated 15 House members answer to him) in a determined effort to defeat labor legislation.

Atomic Burying Grounds

A WESTERN uranium mill — whose owners have promised a cleanup — has been caught polluting a river, from which 30,000 people drink, with radioactive wastes that poisoned the water far above the tolerance levels set by the Atomic Energy Commission. Radium

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from the mill and fall-out strontium-90 from the sky were also disclosed to be building up in the soil of irrigated farms nearby and thus appearing in vegetables and other food crops.

These facts were uncovered only because the Public Health Service was given authority in 1956 to inspect and to correct the pollution of interstate streams. The Administration objected then that pollution is a matter for local control, and it objects now to adding to the federal budget for this purpose. (The one completed investigation cost $50,000, and there are 27 more uninvestigated uranium mills in the West that use the streams to dispose of their wastes in similar ways.)

It is more evident daily that pollution—which, as in this case, is undetectable by ordinary means and irremovable by the usual water-cleaning procedures—will be the big headache of the Atomic Age. How massive this problem is was recently outlined by a US Geological Survey expert, Edwin Roedder, who was asked to look for a safe place to dispose of atomic wastes. He cited calculations that at the rates of increasing reliance on atomic energy now forecast, by the year 2000 the US would have had to find a place for 16 million tons of deadly and useless atomic by-products.

Just one gram of strontium-90 if evenly distributed would be enough to poison to twice AEC tolerance-levels all the water drunk by all mankind throughout a year. But Roedder calculates that by the year 2000 the by-products of atomic fission will have produced between 10 and 30 tons of strontium-90 alone, and strontium-90 would be only one of many deadly elements still stewing away by 2000 A.D.

A safe underground-storage reservoir, Roedder specifies, must be covered, top and bottom, with impermeable rock, must be in itself a porous stratum and yet so located that the wastes stored in it could never reach underground streams and thus contaminate actual or potential water supplies.

But Mr. Roedder concludes in effect that there is no such place. For one thing, he says, chemical interaction of the atomic wastes with the stipulated type of underground rock formation would soon produce a "gel" that would so seal up the underground interstices that no amount of pumping-power could force more than a relatively few tons of these wastes into the underground. He proposes instead the construction of underground concrete "cisterns" some 1,600 feet across. One such well, Roedder calculates, might hold about two years production of atomic wastes; then another would have to be drilled.

Of course, he points out, there is always the possibility that since atomic wastes are hot, some underground reaction or accident might result in steam producing a radioactive geyser that might spout high in the air and drench the countryside.

Anyone for old-fashioned coal and oil?

The Three Acts Of Mr. Khrushchev

Warsaw

MR. KHRUSHCHEV has to be seen in action to be believed. The Soviet leader has many poses, all of which came at one time or another during his ceremonial State visit to Poland in July.

First, we saw the folksy "glad to be here" posture, reserved for welcomes in city, town and village. He graciously accepts the extended bouquet of red carnations. Next come vigorous handshakes or the true Slavic bear hug passed all around the reception committee. If the audience is lucky, they are treated to a few well-chosen words on some subject close to their hearts. At Katowice, the "Pittsburgh" of Poland to the south, he shared reminiscences about his youth in the "capitalist" coal mines of old Russia. "I must say I prefer the smell of coal to any other odor"—with these words he commenced his tight schedule of mine-hopping over a hundred-mile route.

Mr. Khrushchev has also been a farmer. So, two days later he was equally at ease trading stories with farmers outside Pozsan about corn husking and the latest agricultural techniques. At the same time, he was very careful to support Polish leader Gomulka's retreat from the forced collectivization of the Stalinist period. Less than 10 percent of Polish agriculture is now collectivized; though Mr. Khrushchev said he thought *kolkhozes* the highest form of agriculture, he also maintained everyone must reach this conclusion by himself.

A corollary to this pose of intimacy is the stance he takes when speaking man-to-man with the Western press. No one should take his jibes about the "unobjectivity" of the "bourgeois" press seriously, he told us over the table-barricade at the final Soviet reception of the visit. It was all good fun, because editors praise their correspondents when Khrushchev criticizes them! We smiled diplomatically, and the informal "press conference" continued.

Khrushchev is at his best on these occasions. He is the picture of self-confidence, knows what he wants to say, and says it with gusto. No prepared text impairs his gift for improvisation. Jolly smile and down-to-earth humor combined with small rotund figure to create a convivial atmosphere.

He had to cancel his trip to Scandinavia. Why? Because "I was an unwanted guest," he said regretfully. Even the government-controlled press in Scandinavia had "spit in his face." Who, when faced with such uninhibited directness, is going to say that perhaps the supposed wrong was self-inflicted?

Mr. Khrushchev's second pose is sober statesman. We

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witnessed it in Szczecin (Stettin), the German port on the Baltic, where Khrushchev delivered a policy speech to 30,000 "activists" gathered in the open air. What he said was not new—renewed support for the Oder-Neisse Line guaranteeing Polish possession of these Western territories taken from Germany after the last war; and also, a central denuclearized belt to run clear across Central Europe. But Mr. Khrushchev seemed a trifle bored, and so did the audience. His text was prepared (he has taken to wearing bifocals for such speeches), his manner placid without gestures, only stopping occasionally for well-placed applause. Here as elsewhere on the Polish tour the crowds seemed more interested in catching a glimpse of their own leaders than of Khrushchev himself. "He is popular enough, at least not so unpopular as Stalin was," was the remark of one Pole in the street crowd at Szczecin.

Khrushchev's third gesture is the most memorable: the true Communist demagogue who extemporaneously spouts convictions with all the force of a steam-engine personality. We saw this once—at the International Conference of Miners in Sosnowiec outside Katowice. But once was enough. It was the high point of the visit. The performance was shattering. For more than 45 minutes he held the audience spellbound while he reviled the "robber capitalists," revealed his tête-à-tête with Stalin about the necessity of the 1939 pact with Hitler against the scheming French and British capitalists, and told how the historically-appointed Communist system would swamp the outdated Western world in "peaceful" competition.

No one in that hall—friend or foe—doubted the man's sincerity. The faithful roared their approval. The uninitiated wondered secretly to themselves whether they had really understood previously the formidable challenge this man poses. On paper the words often seem like platitudes or hopeless jargon. But in the mouth of the living person they spell out an economic—not military—war, to the death. A few such exhibitions before Western audiences might do a world of good—both for Khrushchev and his listeners.

GEORGE SHERMAN

Rifts in the Labour Party

by HUGH MASSINGHAM

London

THE British Labour Party has been going through—and is still going through—the first serious crisis it has had since Mr. Aneurin Bevan made his peace with Mr. Gaitskell some two years ago. The new trouble has blown up quite suddenly, and from the most unexpected quarter, and at the moment it is hard to see a happy ending.

Briefly, the argument first arose over the question as to whether or not Britain should have an H-bomb, and since then the area of dispute has grown progressively wider. The leadership of those strange bed fellows, Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan, is not in danger, at least for the time being, but a growing number of their followers are in agonized travail, torn perpetually between their instinctive loyalty to the party and their horror of nuclear warfare.

Two months ago no one could have foreseen that this crisis was on the way. True, the Trades Union Congress had written to the National Executive, suggesting that the movement should look at their nuclear policy again. At this point, however, the TUC did not think that there was any urgency. Nor did the National Executive. A meeting, if a meeting were found necessary, seemed unlikely to take place for some four or five weeks. Indeed the TUC said in its leisurely letter that, for various reasons, it would not be available during June.

Then out of the blue, like a thunderbolt, the General and Municipal Workers—the most timid, obedient and loyal union in the movement—suddenly passed a resolution in favor of nuclear disarmament. The Socialist leaders gave way to near-panic. Mr. Frank Cousins, who has inherited the vast empire left by Ernie Bevin and Arthur Deakin—he is now the boss of the largest union outside Russia—was holding his biennial conference in July, and the Labour hierarchy knew that he would almost certainly line up his men on the side of the General and Municipal Workers. The leaders of the Labour Party could see no end to it. Union after union might rebel until the point was reached when the movement might have to accept a pacifist policy.

And here it might be helpful if we broke off and considered the background of the story. Defense has always been a potential danger to the Labour Party. The British movement, unlike Socialism in Europe,

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has never been Marxist: it grew up in the dark nonconformist chapels of 50 years ago, and the pioneers saw the Promised Land in New Testament terms. The Sermon on the Mount, rather than "Das Kapital," was the inspiration.

Thus war, or the preparation for war, immediately revives the traditional thoughts and feelings of the party. It could even be said that one reason why Attlee was able to control the Labour movement for so long was because he understood that a clear defense policy was essential if his followers were to be kept in order. And this was not only because Attlee was the shrewdest leader the party has ever had. Attlee had been an infantry officer in World War I; he had seen his friends killed in Flanders; he knew. He may not have been a great strategist, but he understood enough about war to be able to keep an eye on his military advisers. Indeed the Labour Party's White Paper in 1947 was a model of realistic common sense.

Unfortunately, the present leaders are without his experience. Mr. Gaitskell has never been a soldier. That is not meant in any criticism: Mr. Gaitskell did much more valuable work during the war in Whitehall than he could have accomplished by foot-slogging in the infantry. Mr. Bevan, though an expert on strategy as he is an expert on everything under the sun, has only fought his battles in the drawing-room. Mr. George Brown, who has been in charge of defense for the Opposition during the last few years, hardly knows one end of a musket from another. The result is that, while the Labour Party has been bringing out new commandments on almost every conceivable subject, it has paid practically no attention to defense. The leaders have blandly accepted the government's policy and have ignored the fact that informed opinion—*The London Times* is a notable example—has become increasingly skeptical of the decisions of the government.

BROADLY, the view of the critics is that Britain is putting far too large a proportion of her resources into nuclear weapons and would have much greater influence on America and Russia if she were to concentrate more on conventional forces. As it is, she is spending the maximum amount and is getting the minimum amount of defense. In fact, this is one of those rare cases where the expert and the moralist are on the same side, though for very different reasons.

While the leaders of the Labour Party continued to pour out pamphlets on pensions, on equality, on state ownership, and half a dozen other subjects, the critics were organizing. A pacifist movement called the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was formed, and in due course arranged a march on the nuclear research station at Aldermarston. Ordinarily, the hierarchy could have dismissed the demonstration as a noisy and empty stunt.

There they all were, the same old familiar faces—the vegetarians, nourished on whey and *The New Statesman;* the girls with their jeans and their pony tails; the bearded intellectuals. There was, however, one figure in the procession who should have warned the leadership that the occasion was a little more significant than usual. Mr. Cousins, who can cast a million votes at the party's annual conference, ostentatiously joined the marchers. From that moment it should have been clear that trouble lay ahead. Unfortunately, Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan misread the signs and did not realize their danger until the General and Municipal Workers had passed the resolution on nuclear disarmament.

Even then the leadership could have avoided the crisis. It might have fairly argued that this was no simple problem and that to think out a new policy on the bomb, with all the implications for defense, would take many months. Mr. Cousins would have found it a difficult proposition to answer. Indeed, had he persisted in his agitation, Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan could have effectively isolated him. Most people would have felt that he was being unreasonable—that the leadership was right and he was wrong.

Instead Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan conceived the idea of the non-nuclear club: Britain would give up her bomb if all the countries outside America and Russia agreed to join. Even when it was first put forward many people, both inside and outside the party, felt that the new policy was little more than a piece of political humbug. Everybody knows that France, in her present de Gaullist mood, would have nothing to do with it. The Chinese soon showed that they were of the same opinion. Thus the impression that Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan gave was not only that their proposal was impractical and had not been thought out but that they were engaged in an elaborate and rather futile conjuring trick.

Despite the doubts and criticisms, the leadership proceeded to press through the club idea with the utmost speed. Mr. Bevan was deputied to persuade the rank and file in the House and for 40 minutes used every resource of that honeyed tongue of his. Indeed some of his old playmates, remembering all the things he believed when he thought Mr. Gaitskell was a "desiccated calculating machine," could scarcely contain their indignation, "Good God, Nye," one of them called. Another shouted, "Come off it, Nye." "Come off what?" Mr. Bevan heatedly inquired.

Within three weeks a policy that should have taken three times as many months to decide had been rushed through the TUC and the National Executive, and attention was at once focused on Mr. Cousins. What would the great man do? A lot of pressure was

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inevitably put upon him: he was told that he was splitting the party and that unless he accepted the new line Labour would infallibly lose the next election. That weekend a solitary Mr. Cousins retired to the Isle of Man, where his union was about to hold its conference, and was photographed pacing up and down the sea front.

Mr. Cousins not only stood firm: to everybody's surprise he criticized the leadership on a much broader basis than anybody had prophesied. He attacked the way the party is being run and came out in favor of more democratic methods. He raised, or, rather, he seemed to raise—Mr. Cousins is a rather muddled man and is often difficult to follow—the old issue of nationalization. Finally, he came down on the side of the General and Municipal Workers on the bomb and received the enthusiastic support of the union. The challenge to the hierarchy could hardly have been more complete or more forthright.

It was certainly not a challenge that Mr. Gaitskell could afford to ignore. Scarcely had Mr. Cousins said goodbye to his delegates when Mr. Gaitskell made a speech in which he very firmly put Mr. Cousins in his place. He even laid down what appeared to be a new doctrine. Hitherto it has been believed that the party's annual conference was the fount of all wisdom. Unlike those autocratic Tories, who are supposed to take their ideas from the leader and from nobody else, the Labour Movement proudly claims to be thoroughly democratic: the rank and file decide policy and not the leader.

In his speech Mr. Gaitskell seemed to repudiate this conception, for he said that a future Labour Government would not feel bound to carry out resolutions passed at the annual conference. In theory, this was revolutionary: in practice, everybody has long accepted what Mr. Gaitskell is pointing out. There thus seemed little point in saying it, especially on the eve of an election. The rank and file are hardly likely to feel much enthusiasm if they are suddenly told: "Comrades, brothers, ladies and gentlemen, we all need your invaluable support, but pray do not imagine that you will be allowed to have any say in the running of the show."

Curiously enough, the Labour Party at this stage seemed to be doing rather well. One of the main things that has been wrong with it during the last two years is that it has become so dull. In the past the movement has thrived on controversy: the rank and file need to feel that they have a mission, that they are engaged in a crusade against the forces of evil—and if the forces of evil happen to be near at hand and within their own party, so much the better. Mr. Cousins was doing just this, and the movement as a whole immediately perked up when it heard the heartening jangle of breaking glass. At the same time Mr. Gaitskell also improved his position. Up to now the electorate has been inclined to feel that he has been a tool of the trade unions: by opposing Mr. Cousins he was showing that he was a national leader with a life and character of his own. It undoubtedly did him a lot of good.

The argument then took another sudden lurch. Sir Thomas Williamson, the boss of the General and Municipal Workers—the union which first passed the resolution in favor of nuclear disarmament—decided to recall his delegates in order that they should be able to consider the matter a second time. Nobody had any doubt what this meant: he was going to get his men to change sides. He was practically fixing the books, in fact. Thus a controversy that had risen to a much higher moral and intellectual level once more seemed a rather sordid manipulation.

THE difficulty is to decide what effect this is all going to have upon the electorate. Of course, there are the pessimists who think that Mr. Cousins has destroyed the last chance the Labour Party may have had of being returned to power. They may be right, but it is worth noticing that the Tories have been remarkably silent since the argument first arose. They are not at all sure that Mr. Cousins is their secret weapon. In fact, they have a nasty feeling that he may be standing for forces that are much more powerful than even he has yet realized.

Besides the Tories just now have problems of their own. Trouble has broken out in Africa, and the Labour Party is clearly hoping to create a major scandal. Thus politics in Britain has reached a peculiarly fascinating stage. Up to a few weeks ago the Tories seemed certain of being returned. Unemployment has gone down; the cost of living is steady, and the government's followers in the country have no reason to feel disgruntled. On top of all this comes the new controversy in the Labour Party, and if the differences continue the Tories will mercilessly exploit them during the election. The Socialists will be accused of being disunited on the great issue of the day and therefore of being unfit to govern. On the other hand, there are the Tory difficulties over Africa, the prestige of Mr. Gaitskell, and the muddled stirring of life among the Labour rank and file. Until Dr. Gallup says otherwise it would seem to be a nicely balanced equation.

Not that the question of whether Mr. Macmillan or Mr. Gaitskell has a greater chance of being returned is the only matter involved. The danger of the situation is that Mr. Cousins may end up by doing more than he knows or even intends: he may set off the same wave of pacifism that so confused British politics in the thirties. The only answer would seem to be education and debate, and it is high time that the British people thought out their problem and came to a wiser conclusion than the government has reached.

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INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE US – I

Case History of a Mistake

ON AUGUST 5 World Bank-sponsored negotiations begin in London on a treaty to govern the shared use of the Indus river-system spanning India and Pakistan. This is the first break in the cold war dating back to the 1947 Partition and could foreshadow the emergence of an Indo-Pakistan counterforce to Communist China—*if* the US reshapes its policy to meet the new opportunity.

by SELIG S. HARRISON

THE DISABILITY impairing US policy in South Asia was painfully exposed on April 4 — the day Prime Minister Nehru informed the Indian Parliament of the Dalai Lama's escape. This was also the day that Pakistan Air Marshal Ashgar Khan announced he was to get US jet bombers under the military assistance program. He left it to Washington to say that eight B-57's had been promised, that they were Pakistan's first jet bombers and that India had nine times that number. But he said enough to give the viewers-with-alarm (Hindus who view Moslems with alarm, and vice versa) something to think about along with Tibet. The next week a Pakistan sabre-jet shot down an Indian Canberra and the excited imputations and denials have still not entirely subsided.

At a time when not only Chinese power but internal threats to national survival demand accommodation between India and Pakistan, the US finds itself, in a limited but critical sense, on the side of division. There is little more than an even chance that the 12-year-old sovereignties of India and Pakistan will retain their present territorial, let alone constitutional, shape for another 12 years against the drag of sectional rivalries and population growth. What little hope exists presupposes that New Delhi and Karachi do not work at cross purposes—sapping resources which could through greater coordination of trade and economic planning multiply in their impact. And this presupposes, in turn, a US policy based first and foremost on a recognition of Indo-Pakistan interdependence.

But as matters stand the US is seriously and perhaps critically disabled in any efforts to support a stable India and Pakistan by its attachment to a policy which arose out of calculated indifference to their geographic and historic interdependence. The decision to give Pakistan military aid was in effect a more sweeping decision to set up independent relationships with New Delhi and Karachi for what cold war benefit could be gained. In straight cash terms the sum laid out in a predominantly grant aid program for the explicit commitment of Pakistan's forces and the tacit promise of her airstrips in the event of war; for their "deterrent" value, and for certain immediate military privileges has already run to a grand total as of the fiscal year just ended approaching $1.5 billion. Meanwhile the corresponding $1.7 billion aid total to India ($1.05 billion of it in loans) has made possible—in the name of *countering* US aid to Pakistan—some $500 million in Indian military spending which would have been insupportable without US aid. The State Department cannot fully exploit its great economic leverage to draw the two countries together because US policies in New Delhi and Karachi fight each other.

In recent months Tibet, General Ayub Khan's clean slate in Pakistan, and World Bank progress toward an Indus waters settlement have combined to precipitate a very belated re-thinking of American policy. The Indus treaty talks scheduled to begin on August 5 in London — which may well resolve the dispute over the five rivers spanning India and Pakistan — imply large-scale financial participation (an estimated $500 million) by the US in a new unifying role. This in itself is enough to raise a wide range of questions as to the long-range direction of US

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policy. But at the same time that the State Department began asking basic questions early this year the Congress was asking (and answering) some of its own. In reporting out the new mutual security bill last month the House Foreign Affairs Committee plainly had Pakistan and Jordan uppermost in mind when it observed that "our military assistance has . . . in places disrupted delicate, regional balances of power between the recipient nation and its non-Communist neighbors." Only last-minute White House pressure in the form of a special-session threat forced deletion in conference committee of the Senate provision specifically transferring $200 million from less-developed countries to NATO aid recipients.

Although the cuts which have been made in military aid appropriations ($300 million as the bill left the House last week) carry no area directives and need not be applied to Pakistan or any country in particular, the Congress has, in effect, offered a very clear judgment on the Pakistan case.

The upshot of the new climate of opinion in Washington is that an updated draft of the National Security Council working paper on "US Policy Toward South Asia" is now in preparation. In essence the emerging policy affirms the potential importance of a 500 million-strong South Asian regional power center as a counterforce to Communist China; emphasizes full US participation in a multilateral Indus Development Fund; points to the possibilities for setting in motion increased Indo-Pakistan trade, starting with the cement and steel needed for the new Indus canals and dams, and looks to a gradually improving atmosphere accompanying the Indus settlement in the course of which both countries will "freeze" their military establishments for the time being at present levels. This is all to the good so far as it goes. But the US will be severely hampered in exploiting an Indus settlement for the improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations if the sound objective of continuing to support Pakistan's military establishment is to be accomplished ad infinitum through the existing machinery of military aid grants. The post-Tibet hardening of Indian opinion which was one factor behind the central government decision to upset Communist control of Kerala last week makes this the opportune moment for a whole-hog revision of policy.

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Before considering in a subsequent article how our government can—given the fact of the new military regime in Pakistan—make the transition to a policy which confronts South Asia as a region, one should have clearly in mind that our policy since 1953 has been indifferent to the interdependence of India and Pakistan. On the US strategic map, Pakistan has been assigned to the Middle East. The past 700 years of the Moghul imperium over the Hindus; the very real possibility, until the last minute in 1947, that there would be no Pakistan; the persistence

Sir Olaf Caroe (KCBE, KCIE) and Lady Caroe

of the Hindu-Moslem problem today (65 million Moslems in Pakistan, 40 million in India); finally, the near-million left dead in the streets in the riots accompanying Partition — all of this was disregarded under the strangely compounded influence of British Tory geopolitical fancies and our own single-minded commitment to collective security systems.

No doubt the Knowland-wing Republican desire to "get tough with Nehru" also influenced the Republican Secretary of State who set the present course of US South Asian policy. But it is significant that Mr. Dulles was carrying to its logical conclusion a policy which had been allowed to go very far within the Pentagon and the State Department before he ever took office.

The story begins in pre-Partition days in the close friendship of a most eminent servant of the British Raj, Sir Olaf Caroe, and his protégé Iskander Mirza, later to become President of Pakistan until his consignment to a London flat last November by General Ayub. Sir Olaf, now 67, occupies a special place among the colonial civil servants who sit in retirement in London quite literally pining for the good old days. He is a Knight Commander of the Indian Empire and was trusted with the crucial post of Foreign Secretary in New Delhi under two Viceroys. But he has the standing, in addition, of a world-renowned authority on Soviet Central Asia (*Soviet Empire, The Pathans*) and on the Middle East (*Wells of Power: The Oilfields of Southern Asia*). He promptly

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became, on his retirement as the last British Governor of the Northwest Frontier in 1947, a leading ideologian of sophisticated Conservative thinking in foreign affairs.

Sir Olaf had much to do with Mirza's selection for the old Indian Political Service, the trouble-shooting imperial elite corps, admitting only a handful of Hindu and Moslems, which manned the inner control posts of the Raj. Mirza was the first Indian to get a Political Service assignment in the sensitive Frontier of pre-Partition days, where he and Sir Olaf played polo and rode to the hunt together with the Westernized Pathan tribal chieftains.

At the time of Partition, Iskander Mirza was Joint Secretary of the British regime's Defense Department in New Delhi, and, as one of the most experienced Moslem civil servants, the natural choice to be first Defense Secretary of Pakistan. He was known as "Britain's man" in the new Pakistan official apparatus, if not specifically "Sir Olaf's man." One of Mirza's immediate concerns — and it was no secret to his good friend Brig. Gen. Harry F. Meyers, the US military attache in Karachi from 1948 to 1950 — was getting more and more modern equipment for his armed forces. In the Partition settlement Pakistan came out second best to the Indians in the allocation of military stores, though it got the good Frontier cantonments. Sir Olaf, meanwhile, was back in London, where he and his friends in Empire League circles were preoccupied with loftier concerns — with the "power vacuum" left in the Middle East and South Asia by the withdrawal of the Raj.

In March, 1949, Sir Olaf wrote a "Mr. X" article in *Round Table* ("a comprehensive review of imperial politics . . .") which was to mark the birth of the idea of US military aid to Pakistan and of the Baghdad Pact. "The Mesopotamian campaigns of the First War," he wrote,

> and the strategic movements of the Allies in Iraq and Persia in the Second War, were made possible from the Indian base. . . . At the present day the establishment of independent states on the Indian peninsula entails a new approach to old problems. In this quarter, as on the Northwest Frontier, Pakistan has succeeded to much of India's responsibility, for the Gulf opens directly on Karachi, in a real sense its terminus. . . . The importance of the Gulf grows greater, not less, as the need for fuel expands, the world contracts, and the shadows lengthen from the north. Its stability can be assured only by the closest accord between the states which surround this Muslim lake, an accord underwritten by the Great Powers whose interests are engaged. . . .

Sir Olaf was not at this point sure what to expect of the new Indian Government. "Any concept of defense in this region," he wrote, "must take account . . . of India as the geographical center of Southern Asia." By 1951, however, Sir Olaf had to face the implications of Mr. Nehru's by then well-articulated policy and India was left outside his proposal for a defense pact of what he called the "Northern Screen" states along the Soviet border. "India," he wrote in *Wells of Power,* elaborating his earlier article, "is no longer an obvious base for Middle Eastern defense. It stands on the fringe of the defense periphery. Pakistan on the other hand lies well within the grouping of Southwestern Asia, as seen from the air." Sir Olaf envisaged a grand role for Pakistan. "Has Pakistan a special message? . . . Pakistan may have some new and heartening message to announce. It is not too much to hope that, through her, some new strength may animate the Muslim world." Circumscribing the area to be encompassed by the new Karachi-led defense grouping, Sir Olaf constructed through elaborate maps accompanied by lengthy Haushofer-like analysis "a great oval or ellipse." The oil sheikhdoms along the Gulf "are so closely associated with the whole surrounding region," he emphasized, "that separate consideration in the sphere of air strategy is impossible . . . The outer periphery must be held if the lands within the ellipse are to remain secure. . . . A circle which fails to include Pakistan is incomplete."

In his preoccupation with the oil sheikhdoms Sir Olaf managed to ignore entirely the natural interdependence of India and Pakistan and made of their bad blood an argument *for* rather than against an effort to deal with Pakistan as part of the Middle East. "How is the map to be retraced?" he asked. "It is tempting to draw a blank to represent a region lacking the will or capacity to consolidate its own forces. But . . . because a political vacuum will not endure let us rather divide the Indian Ocean theatre into three — a small circle including Pakistan with Southwestern Asia and extending up to the arc of danger, another gate gathering Tibet, Nepal, Burma and Southeast Asia in with India, and the third an oceanic theatre based on the Australian continent and including Ceylon." If India's help is to be acceptable in a region "where Pakistan stands in the first line, it will be for India . . . to adjust her differences with the sister state in such a way as to strengthen and not weaken their mutual defenses. Failing a new approach in this matter the pattern will assume a different shape and the Indo-Pakistan frontier will become a *permanent limit* between two systems" (italics added).

Sir Olaf frankly addressed his message to "the Americans," styling his book an "attempt to catch and save a way of thought known to many who saw these things from the East, but now in danger of being lost, in the hope that new workers in the vineyard may find in it something worth regard. . . . As America with her new vision joins a partner full of garnered knowledge but overcome for a while with weariness, both are faced with the imminence of Soviet Russia towering over these lands." But Britain, let it be noted, remained in this analysis the senior partner. Diplomats who were in London in 1951 recall that the idea was not, at the outset, for the British-modeled and British-supplied Pakistan Army

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to pass entirely into American tutelage. The idea got out of hand, as it were, when military circles in Washington and Karachi took up Sir Olaf's "way of thought" and adapted it to their own ends.

In Washington Sir Olaf's first converts were in the Air Force. The late Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, then Air Force Chief of Staff, conferring with Ambassador-designate Chester Bowles in September, 1951, offered the friendly warning that "we are going to give you some trouble out there in India because we have our eye on bases in Pakistan." Sir Olaf's book had the powerful virtue of giving precise articulation to a line of thought which had in vague and inchoate terms arisen independently within the Pentagon and the State Department. Moreover, we were then in a very real sense floundering in search of a policy and had every reason to listen with respect to the British with their "garnered knowledge" about faraway places. The error lay in embracing the topi-and-jodhpurs way of thought which was a bit stale even within Britain. Sir Olaf's colonial analysis horrified Sir Archibald Nye, United Kingdom High Commissioner in New Delhi. British opinion is by no means monolithic on matters of foreign policy and the divergence between Sir Olaf and Sir Archibald was a continuation of the controversy which had existed within Britain on the very question of Indian independence.

By late 1951 official Washington had also begun to have its doubts about Jawaharlal Nehru. Speaking at the National Press Club during his first US visit on October 14, 1949, Nehru had urged pointedly that "when you consider the problems of the modern world, you do not try to think of the other person as if he were a replica of yourself," and said, reporting on his talks with US officials, that "I have felt that . . . it was far more important to have a certain mutual appreciation and respect . . . than merely to do it in a businesslike way as if 'making a deal'. There is no question of a deal." He said nothing that was not in character; but it was the first time he had said it in Washington. "Until that speech," says one official who was then in a concerned State Department office, "we had a kind of sentimental image of Nehru and Indian independence, a feeling that nothing could create any problems between us. The more we heard the less certain we were."

When, the following May, Pakistan's Liaquat Ali Khan rose in the Press Club he spoke, by contrast, of some other newly independent countries as "the victims of mental confusion" and added that for the US it should be "a matter of supreme satisfaction that at least one nation . . . should . . . be pledged to clear-cut and easily intelligible principles of democracy . . . "

India and Pakistan voted alike in the UN vote on June 27, 1950, branding North Korea as the aggressor. However, Pakistan abstained on February 1, 1951, when India voted with the Soviet bloc against censuring the Chinese as aggressors in the belief that censure would inevitably lead to Chinese intervention. As the Korean War dragged on India's vocal role in championing the admission of Communist China to the UN led many Americans to conclude that she was "neutral on the side of the Communists."

India and Mr. Nehru needed in these first years of independence to remind themselves and the world that a new great power had to be reckoned with. Pakistan, on the other hand, was in no position even to pretend to great power status. Her foreign policy amounted to a frank bid for attachment to some other government strong enough to shore up her economy and political structure and protect her against neighboring India. Liaquat's soundings in Washington for US support prompted George Kennan, then a member of the Policy Planning Staff, to observe with notable prescience and with a trace of alarm at a Town Hall banquet in the Premier's honor that with respect to the newly-developing states

> we must think not only about the psychological repercussions of the beginning of any program of special collaboration, but also about the repercussions of its termination. . . . We must observe the utmost care not to enter into relationships which might become the subject of misunderstandings either here or in the partner-country or elsewhere, or which we could not be sure of carrying through to a successful conclusion satisfactory to all concerned.

In the years immediately after Partition, most Hindu nationalists did not really accept the fact of Pakistan (some still do not). Their frustration at the fact that upstart Moslems were presiding on terms of sovereign equality over part of the Greater India proclaimed in the ancient Hindu scriptures found expression in a calculated effort to isolate Pakistan diplomatically. This was to have its most thorough execution during the tenure of Sardar



Dulles in Karachi (May, 1953) with Premier Mohammed Ali (left) and Ghulam Mohammed

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K. M. Panikkar as Indian Ambassador to Cairo during 1952 and 1953. But from the start Indian diplomats had concentrated on persuading Middle East leaders that Pakistan did not have Caroe's "special message" for the Arab world. The Indian refusal to exchange diplomatic representatives with Israel even today is an unashamed gesture to the Arabs. Pakistan's geographical division into eastern and western wings separated by nearly 1,000 miles of Indian territory added to her deep sense of insecurity. The sea route between her two wings must circumnavigate all of India, and most Pakistani imports could be cut off simply by an Indian blockade of the ports of Karachi in the West and Chittagong in East Bengal. With 4,000 miles of land frontier adjoining India to defend it is not surprising that a Maginot Line psychosis should have led Pakistan at the very outset of independence to go forthrightly in search of dependence—on anyone but India.

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After the assassination of Premier Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 the short-lived Moslem League dynasty which began with Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founder, was at an end, and effective control of Pakistan passed from the League and the politicians to Governor General Ghulam Mohammed and a group of men whom Philip Deane of the *Observer* has aptly called "the hierarchs" — the senior Army officers and the civil servants. Operative control came into the hands of Iskander Mirza and "his" General, Mohammed Ayub Khan. The desire of the "hierarchs" for a passkey to US military supply depots had first been made clear to Brig. Gen. Meyers at a time when it had a military and foreign policy significance; now, in 1951, that passkey had acquired a direct if unstated domestic political importance for the new power elite. Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister and a member of the minority Ahmadiya Moslem sect, set out to negotiate an arrangement with the West which would compensate for the cold shoulder from her Middle Eastern Moslem brethren and produce arms for the "hierarchs" on whose power he was, as an Ahmadiya, peculiarly dependent.

Until early 1952 Sir Zafrullah, while heard with sympathy in the Pentagon, had failed to arouse enthusiasm in the State Department. The turning point came when oilman George C. McGhee was succeeded as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs in December, 1951, by West Pointer and DSM winner Henry Byroade. Then 39, Byroade, a protégé of Gen. George C. Marshall, resigned his commission as Brigadier General for a Foreign Service career. He had served as military attache on the 1945-47 Marshall mission to China and then as postwar chief of the international affairs section of the Army General Staff until Marshall brought him on loan in 1949 to the State Department. Byroade is a high-minded public servant who was given responsibility for US policy in the critical Near East-South Asian-African region with no first-hand background of his own and little or no guidance from his superiors. He soon became identified with the Caroe viewpoint and met Caroe himself when he visited Washington on a lecture tour in May. ("My Pakistan friends," Sir Olaf writes, "regard me as the inventor of the Baghdad Pact! I went on a tour of the US for the British FO in 1952 and had talks with State Department officials and others on these lines, and perhaps some of the exchanges we had were not without effect. Indeed I have more than once ventured to flatter myself that J. F. Dulles' phrase 'The Northern Tier' and his association of the US with the 'Baghdad' countries in Asia were influenced by the thinking in *Wells of Power*. In that book I called those countries 'The Northern Screen'—the same idea really.")

Shortly after Byroade took over, the Pentagon was given a green light for discussions with the Pakistanis. It is not clear whether or not Byroade acted with higher clearance. The Korean War was on, and Pakistan must have been a very peripheral concern to a Secretary of State. Dean Acheson does remember that "the Pakistanis were always asking us for arms and I was always holding them off." But he does "not recall" having been called on to decide specifically whether the Pentagon could discuss details of a grant military aid program.

Maj. Gen. George Olmsted, who was Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Pentagon from its inception until mid-1953, insists that he was given the go-ahead signal. And at any rate, the issue was sufficiently settled by March, 1952, he recalls, that Pakistan Embassy officials were invited to the Pentagon for staff talks which led to a flying visit to Washington by the Pakistan Army's Master General of Ordnance, Shahid Hamid. This visit, General Olmsted says, signified "a very definite understanding not only that a program would be undertaken but about what they wanted in the relatively small-scale program we were then thinking of." When Theodore Tannenwald (then deputy to mutual security administrator Averell Harriman) called on Iskander Mirza in late November, he was not asked whether there would be a military aid program but how much of what kind of hardware could be expected and when.

As early as September, 1952, the Pakistanis told their "secret" to a foreign friend in a major capital who passed it on, in turn, to an Indian diplomat. Protocol forbade public protests against a policy which was yet to be announced, but the Indians queried the US Embassy in question and the carefully hedged confirmation was conveyed to Nehru. This chronological fact, which has interesting implications, as we shall see, has been verified beyond doubt by the concerned US and Indian officials.

General Olmsted, who went on inactive reserve status in 1954 to set up his International Service Corporation, and who was a registered representative of General Rafael Trujillo's Dominican Republic regime from 1954 to

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

Henry Byroade

Chester Bowles

1957, still believes the decision to aid Pakistan was sound. First, he explains, "the Pakistani were the fighting element in the old Indian Army and anything we could do to intensify their determination to fight the Soviet was desirable." Pakistan's airfields were strategically located and would offer an alternate escape route, a "point of return" for US planes after forays into Soviet territory. "The people over there, the smart ones anyway, saw what we were doing and thought they'd better get on this gravy train." And, as an afterthought, "a good Moslem would find difficulty being a good Communist."

With the Pentagon so deeply committed, and with Byroade in full sympathy, the atmosphere in the State Department radically changed in 1952. But Byroade did not take the final step for fear of open conflict with Ambassador Chester Bowles, by then installed in New Delhi. Bowles had his own set of geopolitical arguments to counter the Caroe thesis: he called to mind the thousands of young Englishmen who had died in the three Afghan wars to keep the 'Bear That Walks Like a Man' behind a buffer-state border and warned that the Soviets would use US military aid to Pakistan as their pretext for increased penetration of Afghanistan. Moreover, while Bowles was cabling Washington in alarm, Sir Archibald Nye was backing him up with dispatches to London.

THE primary contribution of Bowles in the history of US relations with South Asia is often obfuscated; he is seen handshaking his way through Indian villages as a diplomatic Dale Carnegie. In fact Bowles' pioneering venture in the "new diplomacy" was received as coolly by some sophisticated Indians (who resented the suggestion that they needed only to be buttered up) as it was profoundly successful among the unsophisticated masses. In the long view Bowles' major contribution lay in his appreciation of the authenticity of Indian neutralism as a nationalist phenomenon and his determination to sell this view to American public opinion — accompanied by a corresponding conviction that the US dare not, in the interests of all parties, impose a cold war boundary on top of the post-Partition psychological barrier dividing India and Pakistan.

Bowles fought against the Pakistan aid decision until his resignation in early 1953 to make way for Eisenhower appointee George V. Allen. This and the changeover of administrations kept the projected aid program in suspension. Meanwhile, the shock of the Korean War had led most of the State Department, and most of the country, to share the Pentagon's assumption that the Soviet Union had triggered the first in what was to be a series of Communist military aggressions throughout Asia and the Middle East. Time has shown, as Hans Morgenthau has written in these pages, that "the Russian role in the outbreak of the Korean War was one of acquiescence rather than instigation, resulting from a miscalculation of our intentions and capabilities. However, our military policies have never recovered from the shock of that original assumption." This was, it must be stressed, a bipartisan shock, and the assumption was applied with indiscriminate bipartisan zeal to divided Korea and Viet Nam, which confronted Communist military threats, and to Pakistan, which saw its main threat in domination by non-Communist India.

What the ascendant Republicans did to further muddle US thinking was to give it a stronger anti-neutralist bias and, more important, to base US policy on the proposition that cut-rate security could be purchased through Asian manpower. At Champaign, Illinois, on October 3, 1952, candidate Dwight Eisenhower promised to

> avoid the kind of bungling that led us into Korea and could lead us into others. The young farm boys must stay on their farms; the students must stay in the schools. . . . There is no sense in the United Nations, with America bearing the brunt of the thing, being constantly compelled to man those front lines. That is a job for the Koreans. We do not want Asians to feel that the white man of the West is his enemy. If there must be a war there, let it be Asians against Asians, with our support on the side of freedom.

The world-wide "let Asians fight Asians" headlines the next day had as lasting a negative impact as the promise to avoid future Koreas had a positive political effect at home. The President-elect systematically tailored his strategic doctrine to conform to the promise of keeping the farm boys on the farm — and of keeping the budget balanced. Aboard the cruiser *Helena* on the way to Korea and at Honolulu en route back, says Robert J. Donovan in *Eisenhower: The Inside Story,* the President asked his advisers "how to solve what he called 'the great equation' of maintaining indefinitely a strong military force without bankrupting the country in the process." Admiral Arthur Radford, who joined the group at Iwo Jima and was to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, argued that "main reliance for holding the front lines . . . rest on the indigenous forces being built up in non-Communist countries."

Able fighting men in Pakistan or Timbuktoo who could be recruited to the US standard thus became not only a national but a partisan political asset (Secretary McElroy in his Congressional aid testimony this spring was still

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contrasting the $3,515 which it costs to pay, feed and house a US soldier with the $485 required for a Pakistani).

The new doctrine seemed to fit Pakistan perfectly. Parading in grand array before junketing US officials, the Khyber Rifles and the Pathan Regiment presented a superb picture of able fighting men (one which is duplicated in India's British-trained Gurkhas, Sikhs, and Punjabis). When Secretary Dulles, accompanied by Byroade and others, toured South Asia and the Middle East in the spring of 1953, he was impressed in Pakistan with "the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people." This, he said in his radio report on June 1, "make them a dependable bulwark against Communism." On his return he emphasized in a memorandum circulated to a small number in the State Department that Pakistan's sturdy fighting men could be a "great asset."

Secretary Dulles is said to have been impressed also by the political argument that, given the apparent impossibility of any Middle East-wide defense organization, a "Northern Tier" alignment would put him one up on predecessor Acheson. The concept of a Pakistan-anchored pact won Dulles' formal approval, Byroade recalls, on a brief May 26 stopover near the end of their tour at Buyukdere seaside resort outside Istanbul during discussions on the Secretary's June 1 report. Byroade, now Ambassador to Afghanistan, maintains that the "Northern Tier" idea was sound but that the Russians and Iraq's late Nuri as-Said botched up its execution in the form of the Baghdad Pact. In the light of the changes which followed in the Soviet line, he says, it was probably all a mistake. He acidly observes that matters were not helped at all by the devious Nuri, who ran so swiftly with the ball that his formal proclamation of an Iraqi-Turk compact on January 12, 1955, presaging the Baghdad Pact a month later, came without prior notification to Washington. Byroade had not yet confided US intentions to Nasser or Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Prince Naim, then in Washington. He remembers that the first news the US Government had of Nuri's initiative came over a wire-service ticker, and that Prince Naim rushed over to confront him with the news.

Nasser called a conference of Arab premiers four days later; Byroade makes no secret of his belief that Nuri deliberately managed the affair so that Nasser could only believe that the US had entered into a deal with Nuri as against Cairo. But the consequences of the new policy line were equally serious in Afghanistan. The rivalry of the landlocked Afghans with their fellow Moslems of the plains dates back to the days when the Durrani kings of Kabul held Baluchistan as a tributary. Even during British hegemony, the Afghans pressed for a corridor across Baluchistan to the sea. On the creation of Pakistan a dispute immediately arose over the Pathan tribal areas straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border (four million on the Afghan side, five million in Pakistan), with the Afghans, abetted by the Indians, demanding an autonomous Pathan state. Prince Naim's alarm was understandable, and he could not have been expected to take solace in after-the-fact pleas of good intentions. "It is never comforting to be told that one was simply forgotten," commented Hamilton Fish Armstrong in *Foreign Affairs* after visiting Afghanistan.

In a letter to Secretary Dulles on December 20, 1953, Chester Bowles pleaded that if the US did proceed to arm Pakistan this should at least be conditioned on getting Iran's agreement to lease to Afghanistan the Chah Bahar harbor area just west of the Pakistan border and by Pakistan's consent to grant special transit facilities for Afghan exports via Karachi harbor. "The Afghans, as you know," he wrote to Dulles, "deeply fear the Pakistanis. A United States arms agreement with Pakistan . . . will almost certainly result in acceptance of military aid and economic assistance from the Soviet Union. . . ." Mr. Dulles replied that decisions of this sort were always difficult and that Mr. Bowles' views would be weighed. He declined a request for an appointment. In April, 1955, as the immediate response to the stoning of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul over the Pathan issue, Pakistan began a year-long slowdown of Afghan export shipments which resulted in Afghan trade re-routing through Soviet territory. When Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Kabul in late 1955, the Afghans accepted the first $100 million credit in what was to become a $260 million Soviet aid program (an estimated 75 million of this in tanks, jet bombers and other military aid corresponding to our aid to Pakistan).

☆

The sequence of events leading up to the announcement of the arms aid decision on February 8, 1954, provides a revealing example — as had Nuri's tactics — of how US foreign policy can fall into the hands of interested parties in other governments. Dulles and Byroade, after their trip, were in no particular hurry to execute the "Northern Tier" idea, which was only one of many preoccupations of the Republican Administration's first year. There was, moreover, the question of whether or not base rights would be part of the deal and whether, in view of Pakistan's recalcitrance on this score (the US finally got only the implied promise of airstrip facilities in wartime) the pact was worth the fuss it was provoking. In Pakistan, however, Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan were in a very big hurry. The General asked for and received an invitation to tour US military installations in October. Ghulam Mohammed scheduled a visit to coincide with his arrival in Washington at the end of his tour, and on December 1, the eve of the Governor General's departure, Mirza summoned *New York Times* Karachi correspondent John Callahan, who filed a page one dispatch quoting "a high government official"

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as saying that discussions on a US-Pakistan military alliance were about to begin.

The State Department was caught completely off guard: it had not laid the political groundwork for serious negotiations with Pakistan; had not, in fact, reached the point of seeking Presidential clearance for a final decision, and was certainly not prepared for the campaign of deliberate "leaks" staged by the Pakistanis when General Ayub reached Washington and entered into what were to be a series of decisive detailed interviews with General Walter Bedell Smith, then Under-Secretary of State. To illustrate, the then newly-appointed public relations counsel of the Pakistan Embassy, John Adams, now publisher of *US Lady,* arranged for General Ayub to call at the offices of *US News and World Report,* which praised the proposed arms aid program in its issue out November 6, stressing that the Pakistanis were "a warrior people . . . tough . . . mainly six-footers . . . tall, rugged eaters of meat and wheat." On November 11 the AP quoted "British and Pakistani informants" in a London story on US-Pakistan aid negotiations. When Ghulam Mohammed called on the President and Secretary Dulles on November 12, the Pakistan Embassy told newsmen that they were "finalizing" the pending pact, prompting a flat State Department denial and insistence by the President in his news conference on November 18 that the US would be "most cautious" in considering the consequences of the pact. Meanwhile *New York Times* correspondent Callahan, reporting reactions in Karachi on November 21, was one of the few to observe at the time that "Pakistan is more inclined to build her military strength as a bargaining factor in dealing with India on the Kashmir issue than as a defense against other countries, including the Soviet Union. This is a common admission, privately expressed."

For their part the Pakistanis, who had every reason to consider the pact a *fait accompli,* had much to gain from "leaking" news of the aid negotiations. This was certain to arouse a storm in India and put Mr. Dulles in a corner from which he could not escape without seeming to appease Mr. Nehru. And confronted with the clamor of right-wing Hindu groups and the Communists, Nehru did decide to steal the issue for himself. He ordered his Congress Party to be the first to stage the inevitable protest rallies. These, coupled with the equally inevitable Soviet and Chinese denunciations, elicited the inevitable indignant US editorials. "The Indian Congress Party and the government it sustains," said the *New York Times* on December 22, "are playing with fire of the worst sort." Some friends of Mr. Dulles believe the issue was really settled at this time; he is said to have commented that Mr. Nehru could not be permitted to determine US policy. Still, on December 24 *Times* pundit Arthur Krock reported a "policy impasse . . . which has delayed the basic decision of the US as well as the evolution of the details of the scope of the proposed agreement. The subcontinent which includes India, Afghanistan and Pakistan bristles like what Hamlet called the 'fretful porpentine' at the exploratory finger of policy which the US has pointed at the defense of a part of that area."

To some extent the delay may have signified the Administration's search for a formula to mollify India rather than an agonizing reappraisal. In any case, when the decision was finally approved by the National Security Council on February 8, the merits of the case had less to do with it than the simple fact that matters had been pushed too far for a retreat. *Times* correspondent Robert Trumbull reported from Karachi "indications that strong voices in Washington will favor a firmer course with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru."

ONE of the strong voices was that of Richard M. Nixon, who had stopped off in Karachi in December on his Asian goodwill tour. The semi-official *Dawn* of Karachi headlined a US arms-pact pledge on his departure—"US READY TO AID PAKISTAN." Without doubt Nixon's strong pleas on his return helped tip Administration scales in favor of the arms pact against the counsels of such Republicans as Paul Hoffman. Ralph Toledano says so in his biography, *Nixon,* and he leaves little doubt that Nixon urged this alliance not for its purported defense value against Soviet aggression but for the very reason Pakistan had sought the aid — "as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India." Nixon declines comment on the affair today; he has, in the intervening years, taken a softer line on neutralism, in contrast to William Knowland, who was carrying on a particularly vicious anti-Nehru vendetta in 1953. Knowland's attacks were widely reported in India, and Sen. J. William Fulbright, in a Senate speech opposing the aid decision, deplored the fact that Knowland had "possibly laid the basis for the belief by Mr. Nehru that this arming of Pakistan is designed to force his hand."

Senator Fulbright's speech on March 2, 1954, was one of the few emphatic protests levelled at the Administration's decision from the floor of Congress. He complained that Assistant Secretary Byroade had given his first notice of the aid plan to the Foreign Relations Committee a mere ten days earlier. "He described what had been agreed to," said Fulbright.

> He was not asking our advice. . . . I think the decision to supply arms to Pakistan is an unfortunate mistake. . . . I disapprove of this move, and I wish the *Record* to show very clearly my disapproval, because in the future when the results of this policy are evident to all I want it to be clear where the responsibility rests. . . . I have the greatest respect for the people of Pakistan, as I do for the people of India. . . . Their mutual difficulties have threatened war, so we are not unaware of the tension between them and therefore should have been extremely careful in our relations with both.

This is the first of three articles.

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The Superficial Aspect

The Long Example

FOR AUGHT I know to the contrary His Excellency Earl Long, Governor of Louisiana, may be saner than Socrates, Solomon and Satchmo Armstrong rolled into one. (Satchmo said, "Never look behind; something may be gaining on you," the sanest bit of advice of the past 10 years.) Nevertheless, the case of Long ought to serve as a sharp warning to the rest of the United States, for by the dillying and dallying of Congress the country is left exposed to a similar embarrassment.

The confusion in Louisiana stemmed from the fact that there was no prescribed, formal procedure by which the legislative, the executive and the judiciary could be brought to an agreement on the competence or incompetence of the Governor. Nor is there any such procedure to decide the competence or incompetence of a President save in the two contingencies of death and the perpetration of high crimes and misdemeanors. We have no protection against extended coma or insanity.

In Louisiana the executive, represented by the lieutenant-governor, refused to act; the judicial power could not be effectively invoked, leaving the legislative impotent. It is forgotten now, but the nation was once left in a similar condition. In the 80 days during which Garfield was dying—unconscious much of the time—Arthur, the Vice President, refused to act, and neither the Supreme Court nor Congress could put pressure on him. Luck was with us, and nothing disastrous happened; but it was sheer luck.

When the powers of government are divided, as they are in the United States, it is of vital importance that each of the three branches shall recognize the legitimacy of the other two. Otherwise government will be rendered impotent.

It follows that if mental or physical disability makes it necessary to remove the President, permanently or temporarily, it is imperative that both Congress and the Supreme Court shall recognize the necessity of the removal. The obvious way to assure that is to implicate them both in the act, thus making it certain that both will accept the replacement as the rightful President.

Some years ago it was suggested in this place that the necessary procedure could be established by statute without the necessity of a Constitutional amendment. The determination of physical or mental disability is neither a legal nor a political, but strictly a medical problem; but action following the determination is both legal and political.

So if the question arises, Congress could by joint resolution (which does not require the President's signature) request the Supreme Court to take judicial cognizance of it. The Court is not competent to answer a medical question, but it is competent to hear and to weigh the testimony of expert witnesses. It could appoint a panel of medical men known for their skill and probity to investigate and testify to the facts.

If they testified that the President was really disabled, and the Court believed them, it should so report to Congress, knowing that Congress would then formally request the Vice President to assume the duties of the office. He, in turn, by acceding to this request, would be clear of any suspicion that he was usurping the powers of the President on his own responsibility.

If the disability were removed before the end of the term, the process could be reversed. The elected President could petition the Court for a re-examination. If it were favorable, the Court could report to Congress that the disability was removed, and Congress should then call upon the Vice President to vacate the office.

By this means all three branches would incur responsibility for the action taken and would be estopped from questioning the legitimacy of the occupant of the office. There would be no doubt as to who was President of the United States at any given time. The Vice President would be relieved of the embarrassment of determining what is his own duty, and neither Congress nor the Court could be justly accused of acting on irresponsible rumors, since both would be guided by the best medical advice available.

THE PROCEDURE should be established, however, before the emergency arises. The Louisiana case should be warning enough, regardless of the merits of that particular case. The wisest man alive is vulnerable to what the doctors call "a cerebral accident" and the rest of us term a stroke; or to the more insidious damage inflicted by a brain tumor. Neither inertia nor sentimentality should prevent Congress from taking steps in advance to protect the country from the consequence of such a calamity's overtaking the man in the White House.

But will Congress do it? It is hardly to be expected. After all, there is an election to be won and lost in 1960, and when politics is approaching an incandescent heat, prudence is usually given a low priority.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

A Filtered Man's Thinking

by Stephen Mahoney

AD FICTION was born out of the success of Frederic Wakeman's novel *The Hucksters* in 1946. Since then variations on Wakeman's theme have preempted a footage of shelf space almost comparable to that occupied by science fiction, adventure fiction, murder fiction, etc. Ad fiction has become a popular art.

But in 1958 and 1959, the martini mix of 1946 was altered. The hero is no longer a huckster. In fact, he *hates* hucksters. The dirty work this fellow does, he does it because it's got to be done. (The country needs it.) Better that he do it than to leave it to those who *like* doing it (*i.e.*, the hucksters). The theme is self-sacrifice, discipline of the will, the overcoming of personal revulsion.

"Advertising is communications," an ad man named Mother (of course) tells the young hero in one of the new ad novels, *A Twist of Lemon*:

> "It's basic to America. You and I have a place in it. . . ." A single, large tear glistened at the corner of his eye, then started slowly down his cheek. "We are volunteers in a job that calls for patriotism, loyalty, and self-denial . . . It's up to us to be worthy of it."
> "Despite the bastards."
> *"Despite the bastards!"* Mother delivered himself of a huge soul-wracking sob. [Italics in the original.]

Tearfully, unselfishly, the new hero suffers not only for dirty work of his own, he suffers as well for the dirty work of his associates—the hucksters, the bastards. People make snarling remarks about Mad Avenue. Women paw him. That kind of thing. Well, he knows what to blame: ad fiction of pre-'58 vintage.

No doubt he is largely right. And the industry does not intend to sit still about it any longer. The advertising trade press is increasingly loud in its attack on advertising's "negative brand image." This image, *Tide* reported discouragedly a while back (a little later it announced it was going out of business)—that "advertising men are (1) fast living, (2) big spending, (3) women chasing, (4) con men, (5) wear nothing but gray flannel, (6) sell nothing but soap, (7) and [the crusher] do it all through the most unscientific means. . . ."

This huckster image, ad men will tell you, makes real ad men suffer. People *do* make remarks about Mad Avenue. And nobody wants to go home to hear his kids referring to him as the huckster.

ANOTHER unpleasantness is that the image makes clients and prospective clients wary. Members of agencies' "new business committees" do not wear gray flannel suits while soliciting business—ever.

Many agency people question the judgment of the brass at Benton & Bowles in pinning a button reading "Benton & Bowles Is Good for Buick" to the front of every employee on the day a year ago when Buick's people, shopping for a new agency, came to call (and went away then and signed up McCann, Erickson). The pins might have come out of any number of old-style, Wakeman-type ad novels. *Printers' Ink* in an editorial a while back that castigated "ad-men-authors, out to make an extra buck" said that "so many businessmen, already suspicious of the glib, well-tailored, often unctious [sic] ad-man sex-pot-of-questionable-virility in fiction, too often think they see the same things in real life."

But the official view of ad people is that the worst effect of the huckster image thrown up by *some* ad novels is the effect it is assumed to have on legislation. *Editor & Publisher* in an April editorial about the "wide-spread ignorance of advertising's role in our day-to-day life which unless corrected may lead to national economic disaster" listed these steps already taken on the road to disaster:

> The federal government declares that patent attorneys who advertise their services may not practice before US agencies. The Federal Power Commission says utilities cannot consider the expense of certain advertising as a cost of doing business for income tax purposes. The Supreme Court says you cannot oppose pending legislation through paid advertising (and consider it a business expense) even though paid advertising may threaten the existence of your business and your livelihood. Some service businesses such as funeral directors and optometrists in their search for "professional status" would have their advertising controlled, restricted and even prohibited in the mistaken belief that this will help them become a profession.

Negative legislation of this kind is seen as a consequence of the negative image. And not without some justification. Recently the sponsor of a bill to license television in New York State announced grandly that his bill was a shot at the "moral meanderings of Madison Avenue."

Hence the campaign to fix up the image. "Let's show that the image they've hung on us in the lot of half-baked novels is strictly a phony," "Red" Motley, publisher of *Parade*, told a recent convention of ad men. "It's one of the most important things you or I or anybody else in advertising can do in 1959 . . ." "How should it be done?" the magazine *Madison Avenue* had already asked. "Some say fight it by slapping down the booze, babes and backstabbing image," it answered. "Others say present the positive things." A BBDO vice president has suggested an $11 million budget to advertise a new image, and in May the board chairman of the Advertising Federation of America suggested "a 'Poppy Day for advertising' with buttons given to everyone who donated one dollar or more." ("If the big guns of advertising come into Maine with a lot of money," a Maine State Senator has warned *Printers' Ink*, "we farmers will fight.")

Well, when the ad man does get his new image, he is going to look very much like the tearful, self-sacrificing hero of the new ad fiction. A recent

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press release about an award given by the Federation says:

> It is time the public knew the vast majority of advertising men and women in the United States are God-fearing public servants who are paid a reasonable compensation for helping to sell the goods of this remarkable nation at the lowest possible cost. We believe this citation [a new Oscar to be given every year now to an agency president for contributing to "a better image of advertising"] will go a long way in helping advertising's drive to change the public image of the advertising man as promoted by the unfortunate books which have been written in recent years.

Like the Oscar, the new ad fiction marks the beginning of a campaign. By going to the books, it is possible to see how an ad man will look when he looks good like an ad man should.

In *The Hucksters* the ad business was a con game. Therefore ad men were con men. It did not occur to anybody that it could be otherwise, certainly not to the hero and certainly not to the author. When a moral ending was called for, the hero merely had dutifully to get out of the ad business.

In the new ad fiction, while the plot and most of the characters remain pretty much the same, the point is changed. If the ad business now sometimes *looks* like a con game it is only because some of the people in it happen to be hustlers and connivers.

In conformity with Wakeman's master plot the hero is likely, in the last pages, to up and quit—not the business now, but the agency that he had been working for. His reason is to remain pure. If he does quit the ad business entirely, the reason is that he has been corrupted by hucksters and is no longer wanted around.

When the new hero is not serving the public or fleeing the taunts of people who read ad novels he is fighting hucksters. It is tiring. Always he is conscious that in fighting hucksters to keep the ad business clean he has dirtied himself. Often he has resorted to huckster tactics. Had to. Maybe he has half become a huckster himself. The thought torments him. In the recent ad novel by a Detroit ad man *The Detroiters* the huckster-fighter leaves his job and goes to another agency for a fresh start.

Or in a departure from Wakeman's plot, the hero may only come close to clearing out. He may not have gone too far in the ways of the huckster to be beyond salvaging at the agency where he is. He needs a little help. Maybe a talk with the agency's president. Yes! "Where the hell did I go wrong?" the hero asks the President at the end of *The Hot Half Hour*, a new ad novel by BBDO executive vice president Robert Foreman. The hero has taken to mixing martinis for a blond that the client discovered first. In this he has acted like a huckster. But before bedding down with her then he has made her understand the responsibilities of ad men. *He* is salvageable. "Either we use it to reach all our people wisely," he has told her about television at the time, "Or we piddle it away. In a democracy we can't afford to misuse our means of mass communication."

"I looked at her. I guess I've said before she was beautiful. . . . "

Well, in answer to the question, the President, whose name is Harold Day, says, "It's never too late. . . . You believe in this business. You know our country has a productive capacity almost beyond comprehension. You know that distribution is the big problem. . . . Distribution is our task in the scheme of things."

" . . . Dr. Harold Day, M.D., had just slipped me a Happy Pill, double strength."

In *The Admen*, by ex-ad man Shepherd Mead, the agency's President is the huckster-fighter. The President looks like a "hardware salesman from Milwaukee." He wears a suit with a purple stripe. He has "no sympathy for anything but results." And "if he had to take his pick, between talking fancy and knowing what the score was, he'd take the score." No image talk for this fellow. The huckster, of course, is a glib fellow who wears expensively-tailored clothes and has "a rich, rosy look, like he'd been to a barber and patted up." Naturally he has seduced the President's wife.

"You're not too tough for me," the President tells the huckster. (He doesn't know all.) "You never will be."

In a note *The Admen* is identified as Mead's "first serious novel." (There are

Tome-Thoughts, From the Times

> **The special merit of the two first novels up for discussion today is that they are neither overly ambitious nor overly long. Both are deftly written, amusing and intensely feminine. Both are the work of brightly talented young women.**
>
> **Orville Prescott, in *The New York Times***

OH, to be Orville Prescott
Now that summer's here,
And the books on tinted paper
Blow lightly down the air,
And the merciful brevity of every age
Becalms the winter's voluminous rage
And unambition like lilac lies
On Prescott's eyes.

When heroines with small frustrations,
Dressed in transparent motivations,
Glimmer and gambol, trip and trot;
Then may the sensitive critic spy,
Beneath the weave of a gossamer plot,
The subtle pink of an author's thigh.
Oh bliss! oh brightly talented! oh neither
Overly this nor that—a breather!
Along the sands of the summer lists
The feminine first novelists
Go dancing, deft, and blessed twice over
By Prescott, deep in short-stemmed clover.

JOHN UPDIKE

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some embarrassingly old-image Mead ad novels around.)

In the new ad fiction, the possibility exists that the hero may give up his lonely struggle and become an outright, roaring huckster, as if surrendering to the expectations of friends and clients who are readers of old-image ad novels. Such is the fate of honest ad men in *The Big Company Look* and *Expense Account*. From being a fellow who, in the former, spurned the opportunity to seduce a secretary, and, in the latter, ate macaroni and liked it, the hero, in his ascension to power, loses his virtue. In the one book he becomes a fellow who preys relentlessly on secretaries, in the other book a smoothie who cashes post-dated checks in posh bars.

In neither case is there any question of redemption. These two are lost souls. Too far gone. *Their* presidents despise them. "I was blaming the 'system' when what I really needed was some old-fashioned courage," one of the huckster-fighters-turned-hucksters confesses, and "I'll never be like that again," the other one says.

The huckster-fighter of James Kelly's ad novel *The Insider* stoops to huckster tactics while trying to remove one of the species from power. The huckster's name is Noisy Noyes. "Guys like Noyes give the agency business a bad name," the hero says. "They louse up their families, screw their friends, and kill the show. So somebody's got to get on damage control. In this case, me." Well, nobody talks this unpleasantly in the new ad fiction, or even talks this much, unless he is a huckster—or unless he's well on his way to being a huckster. Contemptuously, Noisy Noyes calls the hero "a hard-working boy scout," but at the end of some four-hundred pages of in-fighting and conniving, it is a toss-up who's the huckster, who's the hero. Noisy's adversary announces that he has had it (himself), he's washed up.

Much of this is familiar from the recent ad non-fiction. The non-fiction *The Huckster's Revenge*, written by an old BBDO hand, was published during National Ad Week a few months ago. In the chapter "Advertising's Plight—And What To Do About It" the author writes, confusedly,

> It is quite apparent from this last set of figures [up-to-the-minute scientific research] that the books and films have had an effect in molding an image of the advertising man. If those who would make advertising people look ridiculous can have such success, why can't we do an even more effective job?

Well, we can, we can.

The new image the ad man is building is probably sufficiently unbelievable to make people suppose there must have been something to the old one after all. And—well, of course, there are ad men *and* there are ad men. *Advertising Age*, which deplores the old image, ran a column of advice to the job-seeker a few months back. "Throw a big cocktail party and invite all the fellows who can be helpful," it said.

> Invite some attractive unattached girls. Pour on the booze. You shouldn't bring up business at this shindig, but in the next few days you will have ready access to everyone who came and they will be very helpful. It is absolutely essential that you act as though you haven't a care in the world, even though you have to go into deficit financing for the money, for the front.

Which does not mean that Wakeman was right. *Advertising Age* reported recently the results of a poll that two scientifically-minded agency vice presidents took. Secretaries in two ad agencies were asked to rate their bosses for sexiness. "Contrary to what some novelists would have readers believe," the magazine said, the ad men showed up only about average. Thirty-three percent "were judged above average, 39 percent average, 27 percent below average."

There's no arguing with science.

Words for the Wind

by Stephen Spender

POETRY IS an instrument which can be put to a great many uses, but as a medium it is sense-bound; however far the poetry goes beyond the senses, it is expressed in terms of them. This tells us something about the poet: that quite apart from his having a sensuous feeling for words, he has to live through his senses.

Sense-bound can easily mean self-bound. Not that the self which a poet expresses in his poetry need be exclusive. It can be a very representative self, as was the case with Wordsworth. It can dissolve into the social community, the national geography, and even the universe, as it did with Whitman. But all the same, the self-bound, sense-bound poets do have a particular kind of moral limitation. They inhabit purgatory. Wordsworth, Whitman, Hart Crane—to take the most obvious examples—have very much the kind of voice which Dante might have met *down there*: a voice for ever longing to become something else. Voices characterized by passionate yearning to reach out to some beyond—not the poet himself: the characteristic of this Otherness being its very strong resemblance to the poet himself, who finds the universe as a mirror in which he meets his own features:

> I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man . . .

As Keats acutely observed the presence

Words for the Wind
The collected verse of
Theodore Roethke
(Doubleday; $4)

"OUR OWN ENCYCLOPAEDIA: *Socrates (c. 470 B.C.–399 B.C.) Athenian, demagogue. Socrates spent his life challenging the conventions of his society, in which he was aided by compliant youths (whose intimacy with him was probably not wholly intellectual). Finally the senior tribunal voted to censure him. Following the trial, though he had the opportunity, Socrates failed to carry on his work elsewhere, thereby confirming the suspicion that he has been insincere from the outset. He lingered on a while, ultimately drinking himself to death. R. Ro.*"

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is the "egotistical sublime" of Wordsworth.

It is possible then for the purgatorial poet to create a world; but the world remains his world, himself, the drama his attempt to escape from it. This is very clear in the case of Theodore Roethke, who seems to be describing features which might be his own body, nostalgically viewed in retrospect, a garden seen through the eye of a child, a woman, perhaps a mother, or perhaps a bride.

Mother of blue and the many changes
of hay,
This tail hates a flat path.
I've let my nose out;
I could melt down a stone,—
How is it with the long birds?
May I look too, loved eye?
It's a wink beyond the world.
In the slow rain, who's afraid?
We're king and queen of the right
ground.
I'll risk the winter for you.

You tree beginning to know,
You whisper of kidneys,
We'll swing the instant!—
With jots and jogs and cinders on
the floor:
The sea will be there, the great
squashy shadows,
Biting themselves perhaps;
The shrillest frogs;
And the ghost of some great howl
Dead in a wall.

Often as with "the great squashy shadows" and the "shrillest frogs," the observation is painterly and external enough. And yet it is the nightmarish or reptilian thing chosen which gives the poetry such an ambiguous aspect, the fusion of not-self with self. In a poem called *Sensibility! O La!*, Mr. Roethke begins "I'm the serpent of somebody else," which illustrates well the strong tendency of his world, in which emotions operate like forces leading to fusions and splittings—all too complete—of cellular life in the bottom of ponds.

At his best, Roethke's poetry is tragic in feeling and beautiful in operation. Tragic because the suffering and the way in which it is situated is so convincing. Mr. Roethke has really made a Noh drama of himself: a monologue in which, wearing a mask painted with a fixed smile of pain, he visits a pond in a wood which is haunted by a nymph-like ghost, and performs a very slow and solemn pirouhetting dance, whilst pronouncing some very strange serious-mock words:

You all-of-sudden gods,
There's a ghost loose in the long
grass!
My sweetheart's still in her cave.
I've waked the wrong wind:
I'm alone with my ribs;
The lake washes its stones.
You've seen me, prince of stinks,
Naked and entire.
Exalted? Yes,—
By the lifting of the tail of a neighbour's cat,
Or that old harpy secreting toads in
her portmanteau.

The nostalgia is not just simple nostalgia for childhood of the Dylan Thomas kind. It is rather a passionate regret that the desires of maturity cannot be fused with the beauty and innocence of youth, so as to avoid that accompaniment of mature desire—physical self-disgust.

Roethke's poetry moves in two directions—the centrifugal and the centripetal, and perhaps it is only completely successful when it is both of these at once. One can understand his desperate need to fly away from his own self-center, but when he effectively does so, as in some of the later poems, the images remain the same but the thought becomes salvationist and abstract:

Who took the darkness from the air?
I'm wet with another life.
Yea, I have gone and stayed.

What came to me vaguely is now
clear,
As if released by a spirit,
Or agency outside me.
Unprayed-for,
And final.

It would be criticism to say that the later poems show a falling off from the middle ones. They are too explicit, too conscious, there is too much grammar of sense loosening up the thick and dense grammar of image working upon image. Such things have to be admitted between readers, but I doubt whether this is criticism of a kind that would help Mr. Roethke. His poetry has to develop, not repeat itself, and one can only develop in the direction of greater consciousness, absorbing and using more influences. One does not know how he will solve the very exceptional problems of a very exceptional talent. But one looks forward to his poems of the stage-after-next, and can be grateful for an achievement which is one of the most remarkable of the present century.

MOVIES

Mixed Grill

The Possessors (Lopert)
North by Northwest (MGM)

OF ALL countries, France seems to have the closest relation between scandal and finance. The murder of Serge Rubenstein in New York a few years ago did not seriously affect Wall Street, but if Rubenstein had been operating in France, the Bourse might well have tottered. Resisting the temptation to make large national inferences, let us say only that Jean Gabin's new film, *The Possessors*, conveys the attitude that the Bourse is a place for settling personal animosities, a kind of semi-private *salle des armes*.

The family chronicle—particularly of the dynastic variety—is a favorite of French novelists; this film is based on Maurice Druon's *Les Grandes Familles*. The first compliment must go to Michel Audiard and Denys de la Patelliere (the latter also directed) for the conciseness of the screenplay. Hollywood, in its present epidemic of epics, would have seen the book as a great three-hour opportunity. This film states its case in 90 minutes—clearly, succinctly, and (for its brevity) with astonishingly well-developed characters.

The picture's primary point is an obvious irony: great families that control prosperity and national destiny are as fallible as other families, honeycombed with weaknesses. There needs no ghost come from the grave to tell us this, but the film's nicer matters of family relationships, the skillful and occasionally beautiful explorations of the human core, are not commonplace. Gabin, as the

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Notes on Contributors

STEPHEN MAHONEY is a young novelist who makes his living on Madison Avenue. STEPHEN SPENDER has just returned to England from a US tour. JOHN UPDIKE'S newest book is *The Poorhouse Fair*.

head of the house, the scion of peasants and artisans who has married into the Faubourg St. Germain, embodies perfectly the prince of power, a man who knows where he is, how he got there and how to stay there. Pierre Brasseur, too infrequently seen these days, is superb as the sybarite cousin, a man corrupted by pleasure into egocentric morality. Bernard Blier, who continues quietly to reveal a considerable range, is subtle and effective as the prince's chamberlain. And Jean Dessailly, as Gabin's son, strikes the right note of impatience with the weakness expected of a strong man's son.

A few points are questionable. I don't understand why Gabin doesn't realize that he, as much as Brasseur, is responsible for his son's fate: nor why the Bourse reacts as it does to the news of it. But the film is, in sum, an interesting transverse section of a society wrapped in ancient strengths and fears. There is no exposé in the story at this date, but because the characters are well realized and their relationships ring true, the picture achieves the paradox it wants to create: the masters are their own slaves. If it is a drama without a hero, it is not without an agony. The final victim is Gabin, not the public or his employees, and the final irony is that he doesn't know it.

Patelliere's direction is unobtrusive and, therefore, good.

THE DECLINE of Alfred Hitchcock is no longer news. It is quite clear that the director of *The Lady Vanishes* and *The Thirty-nine Steps* is dead and that an obscene ghost is mocking him by superficially imitating him. His last film, *Vertigo*, was an asinine, unredeemed bore. His latest, *North by Northwest*, starts more promisingly but soon loses us in cliché and preposterousness. (Why didn't the Long Island police know that the woman in the mansion was an impostor? Why was the UN delegate murdered? Etc., etc.) Like an old whore struggling desperately for remembered rapture, Hitchcock fumbled for his early ability to render familiar scenes and objects scary. But the urgent, encompassing reality of his first films is missing, and without it, his antics simply look foolish.

The scene in the cornfield in which a crop-dusting plane strafes Cary Grant is probably the low point in Hitchcock's career—pure comic-book stuff. And in the climax (this time it's the Mount Rushmore Memorial instead of the Statue of Liberty), all I could think of, as Grant and Eva Marie Saint scrambled down the huge face of Washington, was whether the Actors' Studio, of which Miss Saint is an alumna would have approved her performance. But then The Method provides little guidance for hiding under Washington's right nostril.

A much-publicized trademark of a Hitchcock film is a brief appearance by himself. Equally standard by now is a huge two-shot scene, long protracted, in which the hero and heroine nibble each other's ears and neck, and converse in suggestive dialogue. It has the same relation to sex that Hitchcock's recent pictures have to suspense.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

cern—liberals is the complete and culpable failure of Senator Kennedy to speak out against McCarthy at any time during the critical years when such an outspoken stand would have counted. Some senators did condemn McCarthy; to the shame of the Senate, they were few; among them one never saw the timid profile of Senator Kennedy.

JOHN W. GUNN

Kansas City, Missouri

► *Why the Corn Grows*

SIRS:

PROFESSOR MURRAY BENEDICT'S excellent review of "What Is the Farm Problem?" (*NR*, July 27) needs supplementing. Look at the most amazing item in the July 1959 Crop Report, the *increase* in corn acreage for harvest from 73 millions in 1958 to 84 millions in 1959, producing an estimated increase in production from 3.7 billion bushels in 1958 to 4.2 in 1959. If you have followed the present Administration's efforts to lower the level of farm price

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supports in order to reduce acreage, and to get rid of government held stocks and government interference with the farmer's freedom to produce, this simple fact is fantastic and nightmarish.

An increase in corn acreage is the last thing in the world you would have planned for 1959 in view of the supply situation. This year's increase of 11 million acres wipes out all the downward adjustment of the past decade. The Commodity Credit Corporation now owns about 1.2 billion bushels. With market prices below the loan value, it will own about 1.3 next October after the loans on the 1958 crop have matured and next year after the loans on the new 1959 crop have matured, the CCC will hold 1.5 to 1.7 billion bushels of corn, with no controls on 1960 plantings.

The nightmarish elements in the corn situation are these. Livestock is being fed in record numbers and volume, hog prices are coming down and cash income from hogs will decline. This will check the upward cycle in hog production. Even if record feeding is maintained in 1960, this year's corn production is excessive by about 500 million bushels and if the present record consumption of feed grains is projected normally into the future and production is held at the present level, it would be at least six or seven years before the carryover of feed grains is brought down from the 75 million tons we will have on hand next year to the more nearly normal level of 25 to 30 million tons. At 20c per bushel per year for storage cost and interest, this year's error in the Administration's price-support policies which produced this fantastic 500 million bushel increase in the corn supply will cost tax payers at least an *additional* $100 million per year for many years to come and, unless acreage and production are drastically reduced, the eventual inventory losses will be staggering.

What went wrong? First you must be aware of the persistent urge on the part of the Secretary of Agriculture to free farmers from government control so they can produce freely. Then you must know that it is a sacred belief of the present Administration that lowering price supports would cut down corn acreage. Driven by this zealous conviction, the Administration got Congress to lower corn price supports from $1.36 per bushel for the 1958 crop to $1.12 per bushel for the 1959 crop and, at the same time, to remove all acreage controls. Having listened to the Secretary of Agriculture testify before the House Agriculture Committee three days before the July Crop Report, I am convinced that he and his advisers did not take seriously their own April 1 official report of farmers' intentions to increase corn acreage plantings, but continued to believe that merely lowering the corn price support level would result in an acreage decrease instead of a substantial acreage increase. . . .

There were apparently two miscalculations, both incomprehensible in view of the generally and officially well known facts that most of the corn is produced by growers who have paid little heed to acreage allotments and that more corn is planted when prices of other feed crops are made less attractive. In recent years corn producers who complied with their acreage allotments received the full price support, those who didn't, received substantially less. In 1958 the relatively few compliers got $1.36, the many non-compliers, $1.06. For the 1959 crop the price was reduced to $1.12 per bushel for all, but for the many non-compliers of 1958 this meant getting an increase in supports from $1.06 to $1.12. So eager was the Administration to get rid of acreage allotments and to reduce price supports that it failed to see it was actually inducing a corn acreage increase.

The other miscalculation was in reducing the price supports of other feed grains and soybeans by amounts that apparently made corn look more attractive. It was of course desirable to obtain a reduction in these feed crop acreages but the price relationships should not have been such as to stimulate the unnecessary expansion into corn.

LOUIS H. BEAN

Arlington, Va.

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